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COMMENTS
THE INCREASING NECESSITY OF THE TORT SYSTEM IN
EFFECTIVE DRUG REGULATION IN A CHANGING
REGULATORY LANDSCAPE
ANNE ERIKSON HAFFNER*

Plaintiffs injured by defective drugs have several types of tort remedies, the
most effective being failure to warn and misrepresentation claims. While the Food
and Drug Administration (FDA) fulfills its regulatory function by prescribing and
supervising the drug approval process, it is the interplay of the regulatory and tort
systems that strikes a necessary balance between developing innovative new drugs
and protecting consumers from the enticement of profiteering drug companies.
Pre-marketing approval of new drugs has always relied upon clinical trials
performed solely by drug companies. Yet, in the past ten years, systemic changes
have altered the drug regulation and enforcement landscape. These changes have
increased the necessity of preserving traditional tort remedies against the drug
manufacturers who control the manufacturing, testing, and approval process.
When defective drugs harm consumers, the options for compensation are
already limited. While the FDA ultimately approves a drug for marketing, the
Federal Tort Claims Act bars most claims against the agency incident to drug
approval, absent egregious misconduct. Claims against drug manufacturers are
already somewhat limited by the learned intermediary doctrine, which shifts
liability for failure to warn from manufacturers to doctors. Meanwhile, regulatory
compliance defenses for drug manufacturers proposed in a recent wave of state and
federal tort reform measures would limit liability yet again. The result of these
converging developments may be to leave the injured drug consumer remediless.
This Comment examines the role of the tort system in effective prescription
drug regulation and enforcement, specifically in light of these recent legislative,
regulatory, and administrative developments. Part I provides context for this
discussion with a brief overview of current and proposed tort reform measures at
their intersection with FDA regulation, which entails a brief discussion of FDA
history, the current FDA regulatory process, and an overview of available common
law tort claims currently available for injured drug consumers. This section also
addresses three important changes to prescription drug regulation in recent years:
the Prescription Drug User Fee Act of 1992, the 1997 FDA Guidancefor Industry:
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Consumer-Directed Broadcast Advertisements, and the November 2001
Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) policy directive to the FDA.
Part 1I documents the positive and negative effects of these recent changes on
the pharmaceutical industry, the FDA, and drug consumers. Notably, drug
approval times have been shortened, and more new drugs make it to market than
ever before. However, the expedited drug approval process has increased FDA
research workload and contributed to more defective drugs also reaching
consumers at a greater rate than ever before. Part II examines this data in the
context of relaxed direct-to-consumer advertising regulation and enforcement.
This relaxation has led to a drastic increase in expenditures by pharmaceutical
companies on direct-to-consumer advertising. In effect, many of the drugs that are
most heavily advertised post the largest profit margins. This Comment argues that
regulation of advertising by the FDA has been inadequate, often leaving consumers
with misperceptions of the efficacy of drugs advertised on television. When
coupled with the increased likelihood that these drugs are defective, there is much
cause for alarm.
Due in part to the recent scandals over Vioxx, Baycol, and Paxil, the FDA
faces renewed criticism for its role in the approval and regulation of defective
drugs. Part III examines the inadequacy of FDA oversight and the reasons why the
tort system is necessary for effective drug regulation and enforcement despite the
regulatory framework. Specifically, this section examines the role of traditional
tort remedies as both a carrot and a stick in promoting good drug manufacturing
practices, full disclosure of adverse drug reactions, and compliance with FDA
advertising standards. Finally, Part IV revisits the regulatory compliance defense,
and explains why the defense is dangerous to drug consumers in the current
landscape.

I. THE DRUG REGULATION LANDSCAPE
A. A Rising Tide of Tort Reform
Publicity in recent years surrounding excessive jury verdicts and punitive
damage awards has fueled a national outcry for state and federal tort reform.
Several political organizations have led the charge to cap punitive damages in jury
verdicts and otherwise "reform" plaintiffs' actions in a variety of areas, including
health care liability, products liability, and class action lawsuits.' Such efforts

1.See, e.g., Lawsuit Abuse Reform Coalition, http://www.lawsuitabusereform.org (last visited
Sept. 21, 2006) ("a broad spectrum of American businesses fighting against lawsuit abuse"); American
Tort Reform Association, http://www.atra.org (last visited Sept. 21, 2006) (calling for change through
"health care liability reform, class action reform, promotion of jury service, abolition of the rule of joint
and several liability, abolition of the collateral source rule, limits on punitive damages, limits on non-
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recently resulted in the passage of the federal Class Action Fairness Act of 2005,2
which provides for easier attainment of federal diversity jurisdiction for class
action lawsuits and greater judicial oversight of settlement awards.3 Another tort
reform bill, the Lawsuit Abuse Reduction Act,4 has moved out of committee and is
due this term for a full vote in the House of Representatives. According to one
proponent of the legislation, the bill aims to prevent lawsuits that "bankrupt
individuals, ruin reputations, drive up insurance premiums, increase health care
costs and put a drag on the economy.",5 As of this year, forty states have enacted
joint and several liability reform legislation, 6 thirty-two have enacted punitive
damage award reform legislation, and sixteen have enacted product liability reform
legislation. 7
The regulatory compliance defense to manufacturer liability for defective
drugs is one approach to tort reform particularly important to this discussion.
Under this defense, legislation would "insulate manufacturers of pharmaceuticals
approved by the FDA or manufacturers who comply with applicable FDA
regulations from tort liability, or, alternatively, from liability for punitive
damages." 8 In effect, depending on the form of regulatory compliance enacted by
a particular state, drug manufacturers may be immune from liability unless fraud
is proven. Even under a regulatory compliance defense that allows recovery but
bars punitive damages, liability would be minimal. 9 Although the details vary
somewhat between jurisdictions, several states have enacted regulatory compliance

economic damages, production liability reform, appeal bond reform, sound science in the courtroom,
and stopping regulation through litigation").
2. Pub. L. No. 109-2, 119 Stat. 4 (2005) (codified in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.).
3. Pub. L. No. 109-2, 119 Stat. 13 (to be codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1453). Easier attainment of
federal diversity jurisdiction effectively prevents plaintiffs from forum-shopping, i.e., choosing to file
lawsuits in jurisdictions that are traditionally more favorable to plaintiffs by lowering the threshold for
qualification for trial in a federal court.
4. H.R. 420, 109th Cong. (2005).
5. 151 CONG. REC. H633-64 (daily ed. Feb. 16, 2005) (statement of Rep. Lamar Smith). The
proposed legislation would allow judges to issue sanctions for the filing of frivolous lawsuits and
restrict forum-shopping. Id.However, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure already provide for
sanctions where attorneys bring frivolous claims. FED. R. Civ. P. I l(b)(2).
6. Joint and several liability provides for recovery of the full amount of a damage award from one
party alone, even if more than one party is found liable in a civil action. BARRON'S LAW DICTIONARY
255 (3d ed. 1991).
7. AM.

TORT

REFORM

ASSOC.,

TORT

REFORM

RECORD:

JULY

2005

2-3

(2005),

http://www.atra.org/files.cgi/7927_Record7-05.pdf.
8. Michael D. Green, Statutory Complianceand Tort Liability: Examining the Strongest Case, 30
U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 461,465 (1997).
9. Id.See generally Teresa Moran Schwartz, Punitive Damages and Regulated Products, 42 AM.
U. L. REV. 1335 (1993) (discussing the effects of limiting punitive damage claims under regulatory
compliance defense).
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statutes.' ° This momentum has also taken hold on the federal level, where a
regulatory compliance statute was considered, though not enacted, by the 104th
Congress. "
While at first glance the theories and arguments supporting the statutory
compliance defense may seem appealing, a complete analysis of the relationship
between the FDA, the pharmaceutical industry, and the tort system renders a
different conclusion-that tort remedies are necessary to effective drug regulation
and enforcement in the United States. As such, we must preserve our common law
tort remedies against pharmaceutical manufacturers for injuries caused by
defective drugs.
B. Tort Recovery for Injured Drug Consumers Under CurrentLaw
1. The FederalTort Claims Act and FDA Liability
While the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) exposes the federal government
to being sued in several categories, it also functions as a shield from liability in
most situations. 12 Most claims against government agencies fall within the
"discretionary function" exception to the waiver of tort immunity under the
FTCA.' 3 Under the discretionary function exception, government employees are
immune from liability when acting within the discretionary function of their
employment. As the Supreme Court explained, this exception aims to "prevent
judicial 'second-guessing' of legislative and administrative decisions grounded in
14
social, economic and political policy through the medium of an action in tort.'
The Court later clarified the discretionary function as any government action
involving "a matter of choice for the acting employee" where the choice is "based
on considerations of public policy."' 5

10. E.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 600.2946(5) (West 2000) (exempting manufacturers from
liability if approved by FDA, except for fraud or bribery); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:58C-4 (West 2000)
(creating rebuttable presumption that warning approved by FDA is adequate); N.D. CENT. CODE § 2801.1-05(3) (1991) (creating rebuttable presumption that a product is not defective if it complies with
FDA standards); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2307.80(C) (LexisNexis 2005) (barring punitive damage
recovery against manufacturer if in compliance with FDA); OR. REV. STAT. § 30.927 (2003) (barring
punitive damages if drug approved by FDA, except where material information withheld); UTAH CODE
ANN. § 78-18-2 (2002) (barring punitive damages if drug approved by FDA).
11. Common Sense Product Liability Reform Act of 1995, H.R. 956, 104th Cong. §§ 101, 105
(1995). Like many similar state statutes, the proposed legislation contained a scienter exception, under
which drug companies may be held liable if they knowingly withheld information.
12. 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a) (2000).
13. Id.
14. United States v. S.A. Empresa de Viacao Aerea Rio Grandense (Varig Airlines), 467 U.S. 797,
814(1984).
15. Deborah F. Buckman, Annotation, Liability of United States, Under Federal Tort Claims Act
(28 US.C.A. §§ 1346, 2680), for Damages Caused by Ingestion or Administration of Government-
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Despite the broad protections of the discretionary function exception, courts
have allowed for tort recovery for damages caused by government-approved
medications and vaccines in several limited circumstances. First, the FTCA has
provided for liability in failure to warn actions where the government has required
or encouraged citizens to get a vaccine that later caused physical harm.' 6 For the
most part, these cases have been limited to illness resulting from national
vaccination programs, such as the National Swine Flu Vaccination Program. 17
Second, where a government employee fails to follow protocol in his or her
administration or manufacturing of a vaccine, or approval of a drug, the FTCA
may allow for recovery. 8 Such was the case in Berkovitz v. United States, where
the Court recognized that because federal regulations require the FDA to examine
products for compliance with regulatory standards, failure to examine would be
actionable under the FTCA.' 9
Typically, however, decisions of drug approval fall within the discretionary
function exception of the FTCA, in that FDA approval decisions are "plainly of the
'nature and quality that Congress intended to shield from tort liability.' 20 Even in
the case of DES, where thousands of cancer cases were later linked to maternal use
of the drug, the courts have continually found that the discretionary function
exception applies to the drug approval process. 21 Particularly where the drug
approval occurs under the FDA's general regulatory scheme, courts have
recognized the need for discretion. 22 Therefore, most drug approvals fall squarely

Approved Drugs, Vaccines, and Medications, 173 A.L.R. FED. 431, § 2[a] (2001) (citing Berkovitz v.

United States, 486 U.S. 531 (1988)).
16. See, e.g., Cardillo v. United States, 622 F. Supp. 1331, 1346-47 (D. Conn. 1984) (allowing

recovery for damages caused by government Swine Flu inoculation program); McDonald v. United
States, 555 F. Supp. 935, 974 (M.D. Pa. 1983) (allowing recovery for disease suffered as a result of
Swine Flu inoculation). But see, e.g., Young v. United States, 542 F. Supp. 1306, 1311-12 (S.D.N.Y.
1982) (finding no liability for Swine Flu inoculation where government shown to have adequately
disclosed risks); Saxe v. United States, 577 F. Supp. 135, 147 (N.D. Ohio 1983) (allowing no recovery
where damages were so rare as not to be "material" and therefore not necessary to disclose).
17. See Buckman, supra note 15, §§ 3-4.
18. See, e.g., Andrulonis v. United States, 952 F.2d 652, 655 (2d Cir. 1991) (finding that the
negligent administration of rabies vaccine did not involve conduct grounded in considerations of public
policy, and thus the discretionary function exception was not applied); Griffin v. United States, 500
F.2d 1059, 1069 (3d Cir. 1974) (allowing for recovery where an injury was caused by improperlyreleased lot of vaccine).
19. 486 U.S. 531, 547 (1988).
20. Bailey v. Eli Lilly Co., Inc., 607 F. Supp. 660, 663 (M.D. Pa. 1985) (noting that even if FDA
had been negligent or intentional in its defective approval of a drug, the approval would still fall under
the discretionary function exception to the FTCA).
21. See, e.g., Gray v. United States, 445 F. Supp. 337, 340 (S.D. Tex. 1978) (holding that although
FDA was given a broad statutory mandate to assure drug safety, the means of accomplishing that
mandate are purely discretionary); Forsyth v. Eli Lilly & Co., 904 F. Supp. 1153, 1160 (D. Haw. 1995)
(finding discretionary function in the FDA's approval of Prozac).
22. Drug approvals that have taken place under drug-specific regulations, such as the polio
vaccine, may be more susceptible to FTCA liability because there is less room for discretion. See
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within the discretionary function exception of the FTCA. As a result, unless a
consumer can prove that an FDA employee deviated from regulatory guidelines in
approving a drug, any claim against the FDA for negligent approval would most
likely be barred.
2. Drug Companies and Tort Liability
The Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act 23 does not provide for a private cause of
action against pharmaceutical companies. 24 However, state common law tort
remedies remain available for injured consumers. The most effective of these
claims have been under theories of traditional negligence and the products liability
claims of breach of implied warranty, failure to warn, and negligent and intentional
misrepresentation. To prove negligence, plaintiffs must show they are owed a
duty, that the duty was breached, a causal link between the breach and the resulting
injury, and damage. To prove that a manufacturer breached a duty to a drug
consumer, a plaintiff must show that the manufacturer did not meet the standard of
care maintained by other industry participants. Under either traditional tort or
products liability claims, compliance with FDA regulations is viewed as evidence
of compliance with the applicable standard of care, but is not determinative of nonnegligence.
According to the Third Restatement of Torts, "most product safety statutes
establish a floor of safety below which product sellers fall only at their peril, but
they leave open the question of whether a higher standard of product safety should
be applied., 26 Thus, in a claim for liability for design defect, the Restatement
instructs that "a product's noncompliance with an applicable product safety statute
or administrative regulation renders the product defective with respect to the risks
sought to be reduced by the statute or regulation. 27 On the other hand, the
Restatement also provides that compliance with administrative regulation should
be considered when determining defectiveness but that it is not determinative of
non-defectiveness.28
Similar rules apply in failure to warn claims, where courts have recognized
FDA approval of a particular drug manufacturing and labeling scheme as evidence
that manufacturers have satisfied the standard of care in providing adequate

Forsyth, 904 F. Supp. at 1159 (distinguishing polio vaccination cases because of the intricate and
detailed nature of polio vaccine development guidelines).
23. 21 U.S.C. §§ 301-397 (2000).
24. 2 JAMES T. O'REILLY, FOOD AND DRUG ADMINISTRATION 26-3 (2d ed. 2005); e.g., Gile v.

Optical Radiation Corp., 22 F.3d 540, 544 (3d Cir. 1994) (affirming that the Food, Drug and Cosmetic
Act does not confer a private right of action).
25. RESTATEMENT (THIRD)OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 4(b), § 4 cmt. e (1998).

26. Id.
27. Id. § 4(a).
28. Id. § 4(b).
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warning. Thus, failure to comply with FDA-approved manufacturing and labeling
requirements may establish both duty (under regulatory guidelines) and breach of
duty (failure to comply with those regulatory guidelines) on the part of drug
manufacturers. For instance, in Benedi v. McNeil P.PC., Inc., punitive damages
were awarded for failure of a drug manufacturer to report adverse drug reactions as
required by the FDA.29 Consistently, the courts have been reluctant to recognize
FDA approval as anything more than a necessary minimum standard of care
requirement.3 °
There are significant policy goals achieved by courts' refusals to accept
regulatory compliance as determinative of standard of care in common law tort
actions. By refusing to recognize compliance with regulation as determinative,
courts encourage manufacturers to apply a higher standard of product safety than
that mandated by regulation. Furthermore, the refusal to find minimal satisfaction
of regulatory requirements as determinative preserves the role of the jury in
rendering their own cost-benefit analyses and determining reasonableness.
3. Doctors and Tort Liability
The learned-intermediary doctrine shifts liability from drug manufacturers to
doctors in failure to warn claims where manufacturers provided adequate drug
warnings to the prescribing doctor.3' The doctrine provides an exception to the
rule that a manufacturer has a duty to warn of known dangers associated with a
prescription drug. This doctrine presumes that doctors are in the best position,
after reading all manufacturer warnings, to determine whether a drug should be
prescribed to a patient.32 While serving as a shield against drug industry liability,
the doctrine also has the effect of increasing liability for doctors for failure to
33
warn.
There are several scenarios under which courts may refuse to apply the
learned-intermediary doctrine. First, if the FDA requires additional warnings from
manufacturers directly to consumers, the courts are less likely to apply the doctrine

29. 66 F.3d 1378, 1389 (4th Cir. 1995).
30. See Stevens v. Parke, Davis & Co., 507 P.2d 653, 661 (Cal. 1973) (affirming that regulatory
warnings establish a minimum standard of care); Feldman v. Lederle Labs., 479 A.2d 374, 391 (N.J.
1984) (holding FDA regulations are minimal standards that do not destroy manufacturer's duty to warn
of potential dangers); Bristol-Meyers Co. v. Gonzales, 548 S.W.2d 416, 423 (Tex. Civ. App. 1976)
(rejecting the argument that standard of care is satisfied by mere FDA approval); Edwards v. Basel
Pharms., 933 P.2d 298, 303 (Okla. 1997) (finding that FDA-approved warnings are only the starting
ground and are not conclusive).
31. See Diane Schmauder Kane, Annotation, Construction and Application of LearnedIntermediary Doctrine, 57 A.L.R. 5TH 1, §§ 25-26 (1998).
32. Id. The doctrine "shields a manufacturer from liability, notwithstanding an inadequate
warning .. " Id. § 26[b].
33. See id. § 26.
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where those warnings have not been made.34 This outcome comports with the
Restatement approach-that compliance with FDA regulations is evidence
supporting but not determinative of compliance with the standard of care.
Similarly, some California courts have held that continued over-promotion of
drugs by manufacturers, even after the risks of a drug have been publicized, may
destroy learned intermediary protections and render the manufacturer warnings
inadequate despite doctor intermediation.35
C. The Food andDrug Administration:
History, Structure, & Approval Process
1. History and Recent Development. The FDA has its roots in consumer
protection. The FDA was created by the Pure Food and Drugs Act of 1906,
partially due to public outcry from the publication of Upton Sinclair's The
Jungle,36 which exposed the poor safety and health conditions in the meat packing
industry.37 Consumer health concerns again helped drive an expansion of the FDA
in 1938 to cover regulation and enforcement of the pre-market approval of safety
in drug composition and labeling.38 Later, the Kefauver-Harris Amendments of
1962 again expanded the FDA's authority over new drug approval procedures, in
large part due to public reaction to widespread birth defects from maternal
ingestion of thalidomide. 39 The 1962 Amendments mandated the establishment of
drug efficacy before marketing, tightened FDA control of new, experimental, and
prescription drugs, and required the submission of post-marketing reports of all

34. Such was the case in Edwards, where the court refused to apply the learned-intermediary
doctrine because manufacturers failed to comply with FDA requirements that nicotine patches include
warnings directly to consumers. 933 P.2d at 303.
35. See Stevens, 507 P.2d at 653, 661 (holding warnings inadequate where a drug manufacturer
over-promoted its product even after it sent out warnings to physicians of potential associated risks).
36. UPTON SINCLAIR, THE JUNGLE (Viking Press 1946) (1905).
37. Pure Food & Drugs Act, Pub. L. No. 59-384, 34 Stat. 768 (1906) repealed by The Food, Drug,
and Cosmetic Act, Pub. L. No. 75-717, 52 Stat. 1040 (1938) (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. §§ 301399 (2000)) and scattered sections of 28 U.S.C. (2000)); see U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., HISTORY OF
THE FDA: THE PURE FOOD AND DRUGS ACT AND ITS ENFORCEMENT, http://www.fda.gov/oc/history/
historyoffda/section I.html (last visited Sept. 21, 2006) [hereinafter HISTORY OF THE FDA].
38. Pub. L. No. 75-717, 52 Stat. 1040 (1962). A Tennessee drug company marketed an untested
pediatric drug, Elixir Sulfanilamide, which was later shown to be a form of antifreeze. Over onehundred people, mostly children, died as a result of ingesting the elixir. Following this crisis, the
expansion of the Food and Drugs Act quickly passed through Congress. HISTORY OF THE FDA, supra
note 37.
39. Pub. L. No. 87-781, 76 Stat. 780 (1938) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 21
U.S.C. (2000)). Under the original act, applications for new drug approval were submitted directly to
the Secretary of Agriculture, and required reporting of investigative reports on drug safety, articles used
in the components of the drug, a statement of drug composition, a description of methods used to
manufacture, samples of the drug, and specimens of the labeling of such drug. Pub. L. No. 59-384, 34
Stat. 768 (1906).
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adverse drug reactions by drug companies to the FDA. 4 ° Much of the drug
approval process established by the 1962 Amendments still exists today. Although
the FDA has been part of several other agencies throughout the years, since 1979 it
has been under the charge of HHS.

41

More recently, Congress enacted the 1992 Prescription Drug User Fee Act
(PDUFA) 42 in large part in response to demand from consumers and AIDS
activists for earlier consumer access to groundbreaking new drugs. 43 The PDUFA
provides for an accelerated drug approval process for both standard and priority
drugs,44 the additional cost of which is passed on to the manufacturer as a "user
fee."45 Although the original act was set to expire in 1997, Congress renewed the
user fee program for an additional five years through the Food and Drug
Administration Modernization Act of 1997 (FDAMA) and also shortened goal
times for drug approval.46 In 2002, the user fee program was again extended for an
additional five years.47
Under the user fee system, participating pharmaceutical companies pay three
types of fees that are collected for use in the human drug review process. 48 An
application fee is paid to support the agency's review process for new drug
applications. 49 Annual fees are required to be paid for each facility in which drugs
subject to PDUFA are manufactured ("establishment fees") and for marketed drugs
with no generic equivalent ("product fees"). 50 These fees contribute to the

40. Pub. L. No. 87-781, 76 Stat. 780-787; U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., FDA CONSUMER, THE
STORY OF THE LAWS BEHIND THE LABELS, pt. 3, (1981), http://www.cfsan.fda.gov/-lrd/historl b.html.
41. U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN.,

FDA HISTORY: DESIGNATION

AND LOCATION OF FDA IN

FEDERAL GOVERNMENT, htp://www.fda.gov/opacom/morechoices/designat.htm
2006).

(last visited Sept. 21,

42. Pub. L. No. 102-571, tit. 1, § 103, 106 Stat. 4491 (1992) (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. §
379g (2000)).

43. Richard A. Merrill, The Architecture of Government Regulation of Medical Products, 82 VA.
L. REV. 1753, 1864-65 (1996). See generally U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, FDA DRUG
APPROVAL-A LENGTHY PROCESS THAT DELAYS THE AVAILABILITY OF IMPORTANT NEW DRUGS

(1980) (providing an overview of-and the reasons for-the slow FDA drug approval process and
discussing PDUFA).
44. "Standard drugs" are drugs for less-virulent illnesses and those that are similar to drugs already
on the market; "priority drugs" are drugs that treat life-threatening illnesses and represent significant
drug advances. Pub. L. No. 102-571, 106 Stat. 4491.
45. 106 Stat. at 4493-95. The additional costs now passed on to manufacturers include "expenses
incurred in connection with the process for the review of human drug applications." Id.
46. Pub. L. No. 105-115, tit. 1, § 103, 111 Stat. 2299 (1997) (codified at 21 U.S.C. § 379h (2000)).
47. Public Health Security and Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Act of 2002, Pub. L. No.
107-188, tit. V, subtitle A, 116 Stat. 594, 687-88 (2002) (codified in scattered sections of 21 U.S.C. ).
48. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE,

REPORT TO THE CHAIRMAN, COMMISSION ON HEALTH,

EDUCATION, LABOR, AND PENSIONS, U.S. SENATE, FOOD AND DRUG ADMINISTRATION: EFFECT OF
USER FEES ON DRUG APPROVAL TIMES, WITHDRAWALS, AND OTHER AGENCY ACTIVITIES 6 (2002)

[hereinafter EFFECT
49. Id.
50. Id.

OF USER FEES ON DRUG APPROVAL TIMES].
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increased drug review costs of meeting performance goals under newly mandated
goal times. 5'
2. The Current Scope and Structure of the FDA. After years of evolution
and revision, the current FDA has a wide range of responsibilities that continue to
grow. These responsibilities include approving and regulating "all food except for
meat and poultry, all prescription and non-prescription drugs; all blood products,
vaccines, and tissues for transplantation; all medical equipment and all devices that
emit radiation, including microwave ovens; all animal drugs and feeds; and even
all cosmetics." 52 Purchases of FDA-regulated goods add up to almost $1.5 trillion
annually, or 20% of all consumer purchases. 13 Yet, the increase in FDA
responsibilities is outpacing the FDA's ability to fulfill effectively those
responsibilities. According to the FDA website, "although FDA's appropriations
have increased in the past eight years, trends in a wide variety of external factors
poorly matched with
are generating workloads and public expectations that are
54
FDA's capacity to respond in a timely, adequate manner.
The current FDA is a relatively small governmental agency charged with an
enormous regulatory mandate. While over 10,000 people are employed by the
FDA in various capacities, 55 the agency must monitor over 150,000 drugs and
devices.56 The FDA's discretionary budget for FY 2006 stands at $1.487 billion,
with approximately $300 million more collected in user fees from participating
drug manufacturers.57 To put the FDA's budget limitations into perspective, the
discretionary budgets of two other HHS sub-agencies dwarf the budget of the
FDA; the Health Resources and Services Administration's budget is $5.982 billion,

51. The performance goals set in the 1992 PDUFA were further abbreviated in the 1997 FDAMA.
Food and Drug Modernization Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-115, tit. I, § 101(4), 111 Stat. 2299 (1997)

(codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. § 379h (2000)).
52. U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., THE NATION'S FOREMOST CONSUMER PROTECTION AGENCY:

FDA's GROWING RESPONSIBILITIES FOR THE YEAR 2001 AND BEYOND 2 (2001) [hereinafter FDA's
GROWING RESPONSIBILITIES].

53. U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., PERFORMANCE BUDGET OVERVIEW 1 (2006), available at

http://www.fda.gov/oc/oms/ofm/budgetI2006/PDFs/consolidatedbudget.pdf.
54. FDA's GROWING RESPONSIBILITIES, supra note 52, at 5.
55. Eve. E. Slater, Today's FDA, 352 N. ENG. J. MED. 293, 293 (2005) (citing FDA Budget
Proposal for FY 2004).
56. U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., STRATEGIC ACTION PLAN: PROTECTING AND ADVANCING

AMERICA'S HEALTH 9 (2003), availableat http://www.fda.gov/oc/mccleiIan/FDAStrategicPlan.pdf.
57. U.S. OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, BUDGET OF THE U.S. GOV'T., FISCALYEAR 2006 148

(2005), availableat http://a255.g.akamaitech.net/7/255/2422/07feb2005l415/www.gpoaccess.gov/
usbudget/fy06/pdf/budget/hhs.pdf; U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., PERFORMANCE BUDGET OVERVIEW 36
(2006), http://www.fda.gov/oc/oms/ofm/budget/2006/PDFs/BnB I.pdf.
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while the discretionary budget of the National Institutes of Health is $28.590
billion.58
As part of the Department of Health and Human Services, the FDA is an
agency in an executive department under the executive branch of government.5 9
This means that positions at both FDA and HHS are filled through executive
appointments, nominated by the President and confirmed by the Senate. 60 The
effect of FDA being an executive agency is that persons filling high-ranking
positions are subject to the changing political tide. Thus, each change in
administration may result in the replacement of FDA officials with those who are
more ideologically or politically compatible. Many of these newly-jobless, highlyspecialized individuals eventually gravitate to the private pharmaceutical industry.
And, when the shift occurs again, many go back to the FDA. This "revolving
door" between government and industry raises concerns. First, agency officials
may be positioning themselves for future work in the pharmaceutical industry
when the administration inevitably changes again. Also, there may be increased
cooperation between industry and regulatory officials, destroying some of the
necessary tensions in the regulatory process. 61
3. The Current Drug Approval Process. To initiate testing of a new drug, a
manufacturer must submit an Investigational New Drug (IND) application for FDA
review at least thirty days before an experiment is set to begin.62 Three separate
phases of clinical trials take place in the IND phase: (1) limited human trials that
establish physiological reactions to drugs, (2) limited human trials on patients with
the condition the drug is designed to treat, in order to establish efficacy, and (3)
expanded human trials of several thousand subjects, to produce data on potential
side effects and risks.63 Upon completion of the Phase III clinical trials, the
significant benefits of a treatment must be shown among the patients who receive
it. 64 Then, FDA officials meet with representatives from sponsoring companies in
order to identify problems and areas that need further testing and research, as well

58. U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., MEETING PRESIDENTIAL GOALS 148 (2006),
available at http://a255.g.akamaitech.net/7/255/2422/07feb2OO5l45/www.gpoaccess.gov/usbudget/

fy06/pdf/ budgetihhs.pdf.
59. For an instructive HHS organizational chart, see U.S. Dep't of Health and Human Servs.,
Department of Health and Human Services Organizational Chart, http://www.hhs.gov/about/
orgchart.html.
60. Slater, supra note 55, at 294.
61. See Editorial, FDA's Revolving Door, BALT. SUN, Nov. 27, 2005 at 22A.
62. See 21 C.F.R. §§ 312.20, 312.35 (2005); O'REILLY, supra note 24, at 13-85.
63. O'REILLY, supra note 24, at 13-86 to 13-87. In the limited human trial phase, scientists study
absorption, elimination, metabolization, and toleration of the drug. In the second phase, which usually
takes two years to complete, several hundred ill patients are administered the drug. In the last phase,
taking between one and four years, hundreds of ill patients are administered the drug in an attempt to
gauge appropriate dosage. Id.
64. Id. at 13-87.
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as to review results. 65 If a drug passes the scientific review of IND test results, the
New Drug Application (NDA) will be accepted by the FDA.66 If an approval letter
is issued, the drug may then be marketed, sometimes subject to additional post67
marketing testing.
Notably, all clinical testing is conducted exclusively by the sponsoring
pharmaceutical companies. Although the FDA may request additional research
and testing from these companies, the FDA itself never conducts any clinical tests.
While this fact alone is not conclusory of bias, it is important for a discussion of
the regulatory process to understand that the scientific testing and reporting is
being conducted by interested parties. The results of all clinical trials are required
to be reported to the FDA; however, there is no legal requirement to disclose
clinical trials to the public.68 As a result, the public may often not be informed of
negative clinical trial results that occur prior to drug approval.
4. Post-ApprovalRegulatory Controls.
i. Adverse Drug Reaction Reports. An important aspect of the FDA's postmarketing control over new drugs is the requirement of filing adverse drug reaction
reports (ADRs). 69 The FDA requires that, within the first year of approval, drug
manufacturers submit reports of adverse reactions within fifteen days, regardless of
70
whether the reaction is presumed to have resulted from ingestion of the drug.
These reports must include both adverse reactions reported directly from
consumers and those reported in medical journals. 7I However, there is a severity
threshold that must be met for mandatory reporting to be triggered. Manufacturers
are only obligated to report "serious and unexpected" adverse reactions, which are
limited to effects that are "fatal, life-threatening, or persistent." 72 The
determination of when an ADR is necessary must be made by the manufacturers
themselves. Once an ADR is filed, manufacturers must submit follow-up reports
to the FDA detailing actions that they have taken to further investigate and respond
to the ADR.73

65. Id. at 13-88; 21 C.F.R. §§ 314.102, 312.82 (2005).
66. O'REILLY, supra note 24, at 13-89 to 13-91. In addition, the FDA reviews promotional,
labeling, and manufacturing information before an approval letter is sent out. Id at 13-92 to 13-93.
67. Id. at 13-92.
68. Drummond Rennie, Trial Registration: A Great Idea Switches From Ignored to Irresistible,
292 JAMA 1359, 1359 (2004).
69. 21 C.F.R. § 314.80 (2005).

70. Id. §§ 314.80(a), 312.32.
71. Id. § 314.80(b).
72. Id. § 314.80(a); CTR. FOR DRUG EVALUATION & RESEARCH, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN.,
POSTMARKETING ADVERSE EXPERIENCE REPORTING OF HUMAN DRUG AND LICENSED BIOLOGICAL
PRODUCTS: CLARIFICATION OF WHAT TO REPORT 2-3 (1997).

73. 21 C.F.R. §§ 314.80(b)-(d) (2005).
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ii. FDA Advertising Regulation & Enforcement. In 1997, the FDA drafted
extensive new regulations and guidance on prescription drug advertising that were
finalized in 1999. 74 The FDA regulates three categories of advertising: (1)
reminder advertisements, (2) help-seeking advertisements, and (3) product-claim
or indication advertisements. 75 A reminder ad does not mention specific details of
a drug, but simply introduces the name of the drug into the public sphere. 76 A
help-seeking ad alerts consumers to see their doctor for help with a particular
condition, but never names the drug specifically. 77 Product claim ads, on the other
hand, both mention the name of the drug and the drug's indications.78 As such,
this last category of advertising is much more heavily regulated than the other two.
The regulations allow for the FDA's Division of Drug Marketing,
Advertising, and Communications (DDMAC) to monitor product claim
advertisements for truthfulness in statements of side effects, contraindications, and
effectiveness; fair balancing between information of effectiveness and that of side
effects and contraindications; disclosure of material consequences of the drug; and
representations that a drug is safer than it has been proven in scientific testing. 79 If
the DDMAC finds advertisements in violation of these regulations, either a
warning letter or an untitled letter is sent to the pharmaceutical company, to which
the company is required to respond in fourteen days by describing the remedial
80
actions taken.
In November 2001, HHS changed its policy to require that all regulatory
(either untitled or warning) letters first be submitted to the FDA's Office of the
Chief Counsel for review before being sent to violating manufacturers. 81
According to HHS, the policy was implemented "to ensure that all draft warning

74. Id.§§ 202, 202.1 (2005); U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN
SERVS., GUIDANCE

FOR INDUSTRY:

CONSUMER-DIRECTED

BROADCAST

ADVERTISEMENTS

(1999)

[hereinafter GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY].

75. Direct-to-Consumer Promotion: Public Hearing, 60 Fed. Reg. 42,581-83 (1999).
76. Id.at 42583.
77. Id.at 42582.
78. Id.
79. 21 C.F.R. §§ 202, 202.1(e)(5) (2005).

80. Untitled letters are sent in response to such violations as "overstating the effectiveness of the
drug, suggesting a broader range of indicated uses than the drug has been approved for, and making
misleading claims because of inadequate context or lack of balanced risk information." U.S. GOV'T
ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, REPORT TO CONGRESSIONAL REQUESTERS,

PRESCRIPTION DRUGS: FDA

OVERSIGHT OF DIRECT-TO-CONSUMER ADVERTISING HAS LIMITATIONS 8 (2002) [hereinafter REPORT

TO CONGRESSIONAL REQUESTERS]. Warning letters "advise a pharmaceutical firm that FDA may take
further enforcement actions, such as seeking judicial remediation, without notifying the company, and
generally ask the firm to conduct a new advertising campaign to correct inaccurate impressions left by

the advertisement." Id. at 8-9.
81. Id. at 22.
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and untitled letters from FDA were reviewed for 'legal sufficiency and consistency
with agency policy' ' 82 before being sent out.

II. THE EFFECTS OF RECENT LEGISLATIVE, REGULATORY, AND ADMINISTRATIVE
CHANGES AT THE

FDA

A. Shortened Drug Approval Times Lead to an Increase in Drug
Prescription
On its face, the accelerated approval process has been mutually beneficial for
drug companies and the FDA-the FDA has quelled criticism for slow approval
times, while drug manufacturers have gained approval for more drugs at faster
rates. Between 1993 and 2001, the median approval time for standard drugs
decreased from twenty-seven to fourteen months, while the median approval time
for priority drugs was reduced from twenty-one to six months. 83 As critics of the
slow approval process had hoped, a greater number of Americans are accessing
pharmaceuticals under this new regulatory scheme. In 1992, when the original
PDUFA was enacted, Americans received 1.9 billion prescriptions. Since then,
that number has been steadily increasing, from 2.4 billion prescriptions in 1997 to
3.1 billion prescriptions in 2001.84 These 3.1 billion prescriptions contributed to an
85
increase of 16.9% in drug expenditures that year.
The pharmaceutical industry has applauded both the decreased approval times
and increased prescription drug consumption. The industry adopts the position that
increased prescription drug availability is a sign that "better and cost-effective new
medicines [have] changed health care practice to focus more on prevention and
treatment of a growing range of illnesses with pharmaceuticals." 86 The industry
advocates increased use of prescription drugs as beneficial to society as a whole,
noting that "increased use of innovative drugs is saving lives and improving
quality of life for patients by decreasing hospitalizations and surgeries, reducing
87
medication side effects, and helping workers with illnesses be productive."
Supporters of the user fee program and the expedited approval process claim
that society is better off as a result of the recent regulatory changes. Yet while the

82. Id.
83. EFFECT OF USER FEES ON DRUG APPROVAL TIMES, supra note 48, at 9-10.
84. NAT'L INST.

FOR HEALTH

CARE

MGMT.,

PRESCRIPTION DRUG

EXPENDITURES

IN

2001:

ANOTHER YEAR OF ESCALATING COSTS 7 fig. 5 (2002), available at http://www.nihcm.org/finalweb/

pgpublicationsprescription.htm.
85. PHARMACEUTICAL RESEARCH & MANUFACTURERS OF AMERICA (PHRMA), INCREASED USE

OF MEDICINES IN HEALTH CARE 24 (2003), available at http://www.phrma.org/publications/.

86. Id.
87. Id.
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goals of the legislation have been met, negative consequences of increased
pharmaceutical use have surfaced. Upon examination, the negative consequences
seem to outweigh the benefits of the legislation.
B. More Defective Drugs are Being Approved Than Ever Before
Although the user fee program has accomplished the goal of shortened
approval times, there is evidence that the drugs being approved under the expedited
process are not as safe as their predecessors. A recent Congressional analysis of
FDA data found that, since the enactment of PDUFA, a higher percentage of drugs
have been withdrawn from the market for safety-related reasons. 88 For the eightyear period before the original PDUFA was passed in 1992, and the eight-year
period after its passage, defective drug removals increased from 3.1% to 3.47%. 89
This increase is even more apparent when we examine the figures after the
issuance of the 1997 Industry Guidance; of drugs approved between 1997 and
2000, 5.34% have been withdrawn from the market for safety-related reasons. 90
1. Reasons for Increase in Defective Drug Withdrawals
i. Increased Reviewer Workload. There are many possible reasons for the
increase in safety-related drug withdrawals. One reason may be the increased
workload for individual drug reviewers post-PDUFA. User fees have been
successful in expediting review of new drug applications. 91 Yet the new goal times
for approval decisions have effectively increased the workload of individual
reviewers rather than driving creation of new reviewer positions. 92 Because the
FDA continually over-estimated the number of new drug submissions, and thus the
amount it would collect in user fees for those submissions, it has been underbudgeted for the personnel required to meet expedited approval times. 93 Thus, it is
not surprising that when compared to similar positions in similar agencies in the
federal government-and to the federal government as a whole-attrition rates for
FDA drug reviewers are noticeably higher. 94 Worse, the remaining reviewers may

88. EFFECT OF USER FEES ON DRUG APPROVAL TIMES, supra note 48, at 4.

89. Id.
90. Id. It should be noted that the FDA has challenged the findings of this report because of the
implications of comparing the three year period from 1997-2000 with two eight year periods. Id.
91. Prescription Drug User Fee Act of 1992, H.R. 5952, 102d Cong. § 2 (1992).
92. EFFECT OF USER FEES ON DRUG APPROVAL TIMES, supra note 48, at 18-19. The performance
goals established under PDUFA included review completion within ten months of 90% of all new drug
applications. Pub. L. No. 105-115, tit. 1, § 101(4), 111 Stat. 2299 (1997) (codified as amended at 21
U.S.C. 379h (2000)).
93. EFFECT OF USER FEES ON DRUG APPROVAL TIMES, supra note 48, at 9.
94. Id. at 21-22 (citing study by Office of Personnel Management and FDA that compared FDA
attrition rates to those of National Institutes of Health and Centers for Disease Control and Prevention).
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be less trained than their predecessors-FDA reviewers report that they regularly
95
forego training in order to meet PDUFA performance goals.
A 2003 report from HHS Office of the Inspector General also supports the
conclusion that FDA reviewers have too heavy a workload to effectively assess
new drug applications. After conducting a survey of FDA reviewers, the office
reported that "workload pressures increasingly challenge the effectiveness of the
review process." 96 Some reviewer responses to specific questions were quite
alarming. Among reviewers who worked at the FDA for five years or more, 40%
indicated that the review process had worsened during their tenure in terms of
allowing for "in-depth, science-based reviews." 97
Fifty-eight percent of
respondents indicated that the six months allotted for drug review under PDUFA
was inadequate.98 Other changes reported included decreased use of independent
scientific Advisory Committees in determining drug approval, and insufficient
time for raising scientific disputes within the approval process. 99
ii. IncreasedManufacturer Control Over Approval Process. Another possible
reason for this increase in defective drugs may be the reported increase in
manufacturer control over the approval process. Elizabeth Barbehenn, a former
FDA pharmacologist who left her drug review job in 1998 after thirteen years,
reported significant changes in the structure of the approval process pre- and postPDUFA. 0 0 Barbehenn commented in the New England Journalof Medicine that
after PDUFA was passed, "she was allowed to communicate only indirectly,
through a supervisor, with scientists at the companies whose drugs she was
reviewing."' 0 ' According to Barbehenn, the drug approval process has become
"driven by what industry wants."' 0 2 In the same article, a current FDA reviewer
confirmed that "it is very, very clear that the emphasis now is getting drugs
approved," rather than the former goal of establishing drug safety.'0 3
In response to these reports, the FDA suggested several possible reasons for
the increase in safety-related drug removals. First, FDA officials concede that
clinical trials on a few thousand patients are inadequate to detect all of a drug's
adverse side effects. 104 Also, officials explain that the increase in overall
consumption of medication increases the probability of negligent prescription and

95. Id. at 23.
96. OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., FDA's REVIEW
PROCESS FOR NEW DRUG APPLICATIONS: A MANAGEMENT REVIEW, at ii (2003).

97. Id. at 6.
98. Id. at 10.

99. Id. at 3.
100. Susan Okie, What Ails the FDA?, 352 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1063, 1064 (2005).
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. EFFECT OF USER FEES ON DRUG APPROVAL TIMES, supra note 48, at 26.
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adverse effects. 105 According to Dr. Janet Woodcock, director of the FDA's
Center for Drug Evaluation and Research, "[lit is very likely that the newer classes
of drugs in general are safer than older drugs, but you10 6have to recognize that many
more people are taking medicines now than used to.'

The revolving door of FDA regulators and industry may be enabling
increased industry control over the approval process. For example, Daniel E.Troy,
chief counsel for the FDA from 2001-2004, previously represented pharmaceutical
companies against increased FDA regulation in his private law practice. 107 By
2001, the former industry advocate was now shaping policy. As chief counsel for
the FDA, Troy advocated for spread of the regulatory compliance defense in a
2003 address to pharmaceutical industry lawyers. 10 8 It is also Troy's former office
of chief counsel through which regulatory letters for advertising violations are
reviewed, purportedly for "legal sufficiency and consistency with agency
policy." 109 The revolving door of regulators and industry raises important
implications about the purity of the drug approval, regulation, and enforcement
process as a whole.
C. Direct-to-ConsumerAdvertising-And Industry ProfitsAre IncreasingExponentially, While More Consumers are Harmed
Another possible, yet not widely examined, reason for the increase in unsafe
drugs being removed from the market may be the changes in advertising regulation
and enforcement. The FDA's 1999 Guidance for Industry has caused a drastic
increase in direct-to-consumer (DTC) advertising from the pharmaceutical
industry. Prior to the issuance of this new regulatory guidance, pharmaceutical
companies were required to provide all side-effects and risks of a drug during a
broadcast advertisement. "° This mandatory disclosure standard made broadcast
advertisements ineffective and unattractive to pharmaceutical companies, often
requiring more air-time for warnings than for true advertisement. Under the post1999 regime, pharmaceutical companies can now satisfy the regulatory
requirements by only disclosing the major side effects of drugs (either in audio or

105. Id.
106. Alex Berenson, Trial Lawyers Are Now Focusing on Lawsuits Against Drug Makers, N.Y.
TIMES, May 18, 2003, at 1.
107. Anne C. Mulkem, Watchdogs or lap dogs? When Advocates Become Regulators, DENVER
POST, May 23, 2004, at A-01. The new head counsel of the FDA is Sheldon Bradshaw, who took over
the position in April 2005. According to at least one commentator, Bradshaw "has continued to
intervene on behalf of drug companies in private civil lawsuits" and has kept many industry-friendly
policies in place. Lily Henning, Is FDA's New Chief Counsel Change in Name Only?, LEGAL TIMES,
Sept. 20, 2005, availableat http://www.law.com/jsp/ihc/PubArticlelHC.jsp?id= 1127133334301.
108. Id.
109. REPORT TO CONGRESSIONAL REQUESTERS, supra note 80, at 22.

110. Id. at 8.
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visual format), and by "making adequate provision ...for dissemination of the
approved or permitted package labeling in connection with the broadcast
presentation.""' According to the FDA Guidance for Industry, the "adequate
provision" requirement is satisfied by providing full disclosure of information2
through toll-free telephone recordings, direct mailings, and direction to websites. '
The Guidance for Industry expanded the boundaries of permissible
pharmaceutical advertising to a degree much more favorable to drug
manufacturers. As a result of the relaxed requirements, pharmaceutical advertising
expenditures have increased dramatically since the draft Guidance was issued in
1997. 113 The pharmaceutical industry has seized this opportunity to directly
inform consumers about new-and now more readily available--drugs.
According to one Congressional report, spending by the pharmaceutical industry
on DTC advertising from 1997 to 2001 increased by 145%, from $1.1 billion to
$2.7 billion." 4
1. Increased Advertising Affects Consumer Choice. Significantly, this
increase in spending on advertising has had a major effect on which drugs
consumers are prescribed. Between 1999 and 2000, there was a 25% increase in
prescriptions for the most heavily advertised drugs, while those drugs that were not
heavily advertised experienced only a 4% increase. 115 Estimates indicate that
roughly 8.5 million consumers per year specifically request and are prescribed
drugs from their doctors as a result of DTC advertising.16
Other studies have also confirmed that DTC advertising has a direct impact
on individual patient prescription of the advertised drug. In 2004, the FDA's
Center for Drug Evaluation and Research (CDER) conducted a survey of both
patients and physicians regarding the impact of DTC advertising." 7 Thirty-nine
percent of patients who asked their doctors about availability of prescriptions for a
condition requested a specific brand." 8 In response, half of those patients reported
that doctors prescribed the specific brand about which they inquired. 19 Even more
alarming, 41% of all participating physicians indicated that their patient was
20
confused about the effectiveness of the drug because of the DTC advertisement.

111. 21 C.F.R. §§ 202, 202.1(e)(1) (2005); GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY, supra note 74, at 2.
112. REPORT TO CONGRESSIONAL REQUESTERS, supra note 80, at 2-3.

113. Id.at 3.
114. Id.at3, 9.
115. Id. at3.
116. Id.at4.
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EVALUATION & RESEARCH,
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119. Id.
120. Id.at6-7.

HUMAN SERVS.,
PROMOTION OF

RESULTS 2 (2004), available at

http://www.fda.gov/cder/ddmac/Final%20Report/FRFinalExSu II 19042.pdf.
118. Id. at 4.
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Finally, a majority (65%) of physicians reported that their patients confused the
relative risks and benefits of DTC-advertised drugs, and an even greater proportion
(75%) report that these advertisements led patients to over-estimate the efficacy of
12 1
these drugs.
2. IncreasedAdvertising Leads to Increased Profits. The increase in DTC
advertising has been extremely beneficial for the pharmaceutical industry. In
2000, the most heavily advertised drug in the DTC market was Vioxx (rofecoxib),
the anti-inflammatory drug manufactured by Merck. 122 According to the National
Institute for Healthcare Management, Merck spent $160.8 million promoting the
drug through various media outlets that year, part of the company's one-year 117%
increase in DTC advertising. 12 3 As a result, retail sales of Vioxx quadrupledfrom
$329.5 million in 1999 to $1.5 billion in 2000. 124 Merck was not the only
company to reap huge profits from advertising investments. Pfizer increased its
total spending on DTC advertising by 98.5% between 1999 and 2000, and spent
$58.2 million on DTC advertising for the cholesterol reducer Lipitor in 2000.125
26
By the end of that year, Pfizer experienced a 38.8% increase in sales of Lipitor.1
3. While Profits and Ads Are On the Rise, Enforcement Proves Ineffective.
While drug industry advertising has multiplied exponentially, the 2001 HHS
changes to regulatory enforcement procedures have dramatically increased the
amount of time between the observation of a violation and the issuance of a
regulatory letter to the offending corporation. Prior to the policy change, letters
were issued within several days of receipt of notice of a violation. 127 After the
policy change, a Congressional report concluded that the Office of the Chief
Counsel's "reviews of draft regulatory letters from FDA have taken so long that
misleading advertisements may have completed their broadcast life cycle before
FDA issued the letters."' 28 In other words, most ads have already stopped airing
by the time that regulatory letters are received.
The result of the HHS policy change is that the time it takes between
manufacturer violation and FDA reprimand renders any enforcement completely
ineffective. Worse, this policy seems part of a larger initiative to increase industry
profits while decreasing industry liability. As previously noted, all regulatory

121. Id. at 8.
122. NAT'L INST. FOR HEALTHCARE MGMT, PRESCRIPTION DRUGS AND MASS MEDIA ADVERTISING

6 (2000), available at http://www.nihcm.org/finalweb/DTCbrief.pdf.
123. Id. at 2, 10 fig.6.
124. Id. at 4 fig.4, 9 fig.5.
125. Id. at 9 fig.5, 10 fig.6.
126. Id. at 9 fig.5. Sales of Lipitor amounted to over $1.03 billion in 2000. Pfizer, Inc., 2004
Financial Report 1 (Feb. 24, 2005).
127. REPORT TO CONGRESSIONAL REQUESTERS, supra note 80, at 22.
128. Id. at 23. A 2002 sampling of regulatory-letter turnaround time from OCC showed a range of
between thirteen and seventy-eight days. Id.
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letters must now be reviewed by the FDA's office of chief legal counsel. This is
the same office that continues to implement many of the policies instituted under
former chief counsel-and former pharmaceutical industry advocate-Daniel
Troy.12 9 According to a recent letter from Rep. Henry Waxman to HHS Secretary
Tommy Thompson, "This . . . may be a welcome development for the drug
industry, but it poses serious dangers to public health."' 30
In the regulation of drug advertising, time is truly of the essence. Because
just one commercial may trigger consumers to seek a particular prescription drug,
any misrepresentation is only magnified by an ad's increased air time. Even when
pharmaceutical companies receive warning letters, some drugs continue to be
marketed with aggressive and misleading advertisements. The Government
Accountability Office reported to Congress that "FDA's oversight has not
prevented some pharmaceutical companies from repeatedly disseminating new
misleading advertisements for the same drug . .. ,,13 1 To put it simply, the profit
incentives of drug companies often far outweigh the costs of a regulatory letter's
being issued, particularly when the offending ad may have already run its
broadcast life by the time the letter is issued.
i. The Worst Regulatory Offenders Often Reap the Greatest Profits. Some of
the most egregious examples of advertising violations are ads for the most
lucrative drugs. One of the worst examples of repeated disregard for the FDA's
regulatory enforcement has been from Pfizer. Between 1998 and 2002, the FDA
issued four regulatory letters to Pfizer for producing misleading ads for its
blockbuster cholesterol-lowering drug Lipitor. i32 The FDA continually charged
that Pfizer misrepresented the severity of side effects, the overall safety of the
drug, and the effectiveness of Lipitor as compared to other similar products. 133 As
a result, Pfizer was required to pull the misleading ad from the broadcast market.
Even so, the public witnessed days and weeks of advertising in which it was
exposed to misleading statements of Lipitor's efficacy. Yet the benefits to Pfizer
that run from deceptive over-promotion of Lipitor tremendously outweigh the
FDA's effective slap on the wrist; Pfizer posted 2004 revenues for Lipitor in
34
excess of $10.8 billion.'

129. Mulkem, supra note 107; Henning, supra note 107.
130. Mulkem, supra note 107.
131.

REPORT TO CONGRESSIONAL REQUESTERS, supra note 80, at 4.

132. Id. at 21.
133. Letter from Joan Hankin, Consumer Protection Analyst, Division of Drug Marketing,
Advertising, and Communications, U.S. Dept. of Health & Human Servs., to Christopher A. Graham,
Director, Worldwide Regulatory Strategy, Pfizer (Aug. 12, 2002), available at http://www.fda.gov/cder/

wam/2002/10939.pdf.
134. PFIZER, 2004 FINANCIAL REPORT I (2004),
annualreport/2004/financial/indexfinancial.jsp.

available at http://www.pfizer.com/pfizer/
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ii. Sometimes, the Worst Offenders of Advertising Regulation are Selling
Dangzerous Drugs. Vioxx is the best, and perhaps the most egregious, example of
a pharmaceutical manufacturer's misleading the public through over-promotion of
a dangerous drug. Unfortunately, Vioxx also serves as an example of the
inadequacy of the FDA in enforcing advertising regulations. As noted above,
Merck relied successfully upon DTC advertising in its promotion of its new antiinflammatory drug Vioxx following FDA approval in 1999. When Vioxx was
voluntarily withdrawn from the market on September 30, 2004, due to increased
risks of myocardial infarction (heart attack) and strokes, annual profits from sales
35
of Vioxx exceeded $2.5 billion per year.
The most disturbing aspect of this particular case is that the FDA was aware
that Vioxx caused an increase in heart attacks and stroke, and unsuccessfully
reprimanded Merck for advertising exactly the opposite conclusion. In 2001,
Merck received a warning letter about making false and misleading advertising
claims that Vioxx did not increase incidence of myocardial infarction and stroke.
The FDA warning letter to Merck states:
You have engaged in a promotional campaign for Vioxx that miminizes
the potentially serious cardiovascular findings that were observed in the
Vioxx Gastrointestinal Outcomes Research (VIGOR) study, and thus,
misrepresents the safety profile for Vioxx. Specifically, your
promotional campaign discounts the fact that in the VIGOR study,
patients on Vioxx were observed to have a four to five fold increase in
myocardial infarctions (MIs) compared to patients on the comparator
non-steroidal36 anti-inflammatory
drug
(NSAID),
Naprosyn
1
(naproxen).

The warning letter references an earlier regulatory letter sent to Merck for the
exact same violation the previous year. As the warning letter later confirms,
Merck's "misrepresentation of the safety profile for Vioxx is particularly
troublesome because we have previously, in an untitled letter, objected to
37
promotional materials that have also misrepresented Vioxx's safety profile."'
By the time that Vioxx was withdrawn from the market in 2004, three years
after this warning letter was issued, tens of millions of patients were taking
rofecoxib. During Vioxx's time on the market, Merck aggressively defended

135. Eric J. Topol, Failing the Public Health - Rofecoxib, Merck, and the FDA, 351 NEw ENG. J.
MED. 1707, 1707 (2004).

136. Letter from Thomas W. Abrams, Director, Division of Drug Marketing, Advertising, and
Communications, U.S. Dept. of Health & Human Servs., to Raymond V. Gilmartin, President and CEO,
Merck & Co., Inc. (Sept. 17, 2001), available at http://www.fda.gov/cder/wam/2001/9456.pdf
(emphasis added).
137. Id. at 2.
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numerous independent studies questioning the safety of Vioxx. 13 8 According to
one doctor and commentator, "Sadly, it is clear to me that Merck's commercial
interest in rofecoxib sales exceeded its concern about the drug's potential
cardiovascular toxicity."' 39 Apparently, Merck had notice both from the FDA and
from independent researchers that Vioxx was dangerous, but continued to
aggressively market the drug despite these warnings and attempts at regulation.
Such egregious disregard for FDA advertising regulations has prompted
legislators in both houses of Congress to introduce legislation that would amend
the Internal Revenue Service Code to limit each manufacturer's tax deductions for
prescription drug advertising to the level of research and development
expenditures. 140 Other legislators have suggested reducing deduction amounts to
half of expenditures on research and development,'14 and even complete revocation
of tax deductions for DTC advertising. 42 Yet at least one recent Supreme Court
case has brought the constitutionality of such advertising restrictions into question.
4. ConstitutionalBarriers to Advertising Regulation. We are currently the
only country, aside from New Zealand, that allows DTC advertising. 143 While it is
tempting to argue that tougher or even prohibitory regulations would solve the
DTC problem altogether, the Supreme Court recognizes direct limitations on this
type of commercial speech as a violation of the First Amendment.'" In Thompson
v. Western States Medical Center, the FDA argued in defense of its regulatory ban
on the advertising of compound pharmaceutical products. 145 A majority of the
Court reasoned that prohibiting advertising of compound drugs would prevent
useful speech. The Court also argued that it was not the least restrictive means of
accomplishing the goal of protecting public health. 146 Under Thompson, even
147
proposed indirect limitations may be struck down as unconstitutional.

138. Topol, supra note 135, at 1707. These aggressive defenses included Merck's press release
entitled "Merck Reconfirms Favorable Cardiovascular Safety of Vioxx" and several papers written by
Merck employees and published in medical literature. Further, Merck sponsored numerous educational
symposiums at national meetings "in an effort to debunk the concern about adverse cardiovascular
effects." Id.
139. Id.at 1708.

140. Fair Advertising and Increased Research (FAIR) Act, H.R. 4821, 107th Cong. § 2801 (2002);
S.2486, 107th Cong. § 2801 (2002); Francis B. Palumbo & C. Daniel Mullins, The Development of
Direct-to-ConsumerPrescriptionDrug Advertising Regulation, 57 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 423, 434 (2002).

141. Prescription Affordability and Medicine Safety Act of 2002, H.R. 5350, 107th Cong. §
2801(a).
142. Say No to Drug Ads Act, H.R. 5105, 107th Cong. § 2801 (2002); 148 CONG. REC. 4552 (July

11,2002).
143. Palumbo & Mullins, supra note 140, at 431.

144. Thompson v. Western States Medical Center, 535 U.S. 357, 366-68, 377 (2002).
145. Palumbo & Mullins, supra note 140, at 441.
146. Thompson, 535 U.S. at 374-76.
147. See Palumbo & Mullins, supra note 140, at 442.
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Although recent legislative, regulatory, and administrative changes at the
FDA have decreased drug approval times, the American public is suffering the
consequences of these industry-friendly developments. The convergence of
expedited approval processes, relaxed advertising regulations, and decreased
regulatory enforcement has led to a noticeable increase in consumption of
prescription drugs-and industry profits. Unfortunately, statistics also show that
more of these new drugs are unsafe for consumers. In many circumstances, it is
the most heavily advertised and profitable drugs that are the most harmful. These
developments add an increased urgency to the preservation of tort remedies against
drug manufacturers.

Ill. THE ROLE OF THE TORT SYSTEM IN DRUG INDUSTRY REGULATION AND
ENFORCEMENT IS ESSENTIAL TO CONSUMER PROTECTION IN THE

TRANSFORMED REGULATORY LANDSCAPE

As pharmaceutical sales and drug availability are on the rise, the FDA faces
new criticism arising from several well-publicized withdrawals of FDA-approved
drugs. 148 Although some problems with the drug approval process existed long
before the most recent legislative and regulatory changes, these developments have
only magnified previous criticism. As a result, there is increasing public concern
that consumers are not adequately protected from harmful drugs.
Like the FDA, the tort system provides an incentive to produce safe drugs
and regulatory enforcement when drugs are proven unsafe. The tort system
currently works along with the FDA to compensate drug consumers where
regulation has failed. In fact, the evidentiary basis for many tort actions is often
provided by FDA regulation and enforcement proceedings. Tort remedies offer the
benefit of sending a clear message to pharmaceutical companies that liability may
exist where they choose to value profits over consumer safety.
A. Tort Claims Provide Remedies Where FDA Approves Defective Drugs
1. The Scope of the Defective Drug Approval Problem
During the entire pre-marketing drug approval process, all clinical testing is
performed either by pharmaceutical company employees or by independent
researchers paid by the pharmaceutical company that sponsors the drug.' 49 In

148. See discussion supra part lI(C)(3)(ii) and accompanying notes; discussion infra part III
(A)(2)(ii) and accompanying notes.
149. See Green, supra note 8, at 481 (noting that "FDA's approval of a drug, which includes a
determination of the appropriate labeling (i.e., warnings) is wholly dependant on testing performed and
reported by the sponsoring manufacturer.").
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effect, all proof of drug safety and efficacy required under the 1962 KefauverHarris Amendments is demonstrated by the pharmaceutical companies
themselves. I50 While the FDA reviews these applications, and occasionally
requests additional information during their review, FDA researchers do not
perform any independent testing. Most importantly, negative scientific findings at
any phase of the clinical trial are under the control of the drug company, and very
likely may not be publicized when the drug makes it to market. In fact, even
though negative results are included in new drug applications, the FDA is under no
legal obligation to report such findings to the public.' 5 '
The pre-marketing drug approval process has proven seriously inadequate in
making preliminary determinations of the efficacy and safety of pharmaceuticals.
A 1990 study by the General Accountability Office (GAO) reviewed all approved
152
prescription drugs between 1976 and 1985 for incidents of adverse reaction.
The GAO reported that over 50% of all prescription drugs approved by the FDA
153
had serious risks that failed to be exposed in the new drug application phase.
While it is inevitable that some defective drugs may slip through the FDA approval
process, the current influx of defective drugs under the existing regulatory
landscape makes tort remedies more necessary than ever before.
2. Examples of Successful Tort Intervention
i. Pediatric Use of Paxil. While the use of selective serotonin reuptake
inhibitors (SSRls) to treat pediatric depression was approved by the FDA, it was
not until tort claims were initiated that dangers were exposed to consumers. In the
first quarter of 2004, GlaxoSmithKline made $533 million in profits from sales of
one version of the SSRI paroxetine, also known as Paxil.' 5 4 Unbeknownst to
consumers were results from two 1998 clinical trials indicating not only that Paxil
was ineffective for treating pediatric depression but that incidents of suicidal
tendencies among trial participants administered the drug were 3.2 times higher
than those for patients given a placebo.' 55 While the FDA received the results of

150. 21 U.S.C. § 355(b)(1)(A) (2000).
151. See Rennie, supra note 68, at 1359 (noting that negative trial results reported to FDA
"disappear without a trace" because FDA has no mandate to disseminate this negative information).
152. U.S. Gov'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, FDA DRUG REVIEW: POSTAPPROVAL RISKS 1976-85 3
(1990), available at http://l61.203.16.4/d24t8/141456.pdf. GAO conducted this review to determine
the "frequency and seriousness of the additional risks linked to these drugs after their initial approval."
Id. at 3. Additional adverse effects were indicated by subsequent removal from the market or revision
in labeling. Id. at 11.
153. Id. at 51.
154. Rennie, supra note 68, at 1360.
155. Id. at 1359; Wayne Kondro & Barbara Sibbald, PharmaceuticalIndustry: Drug Company
Experts Advised Staff to Withhold DataAbout SSR1 Use in Children, 170 CAN. MED. ASS'N J. 783, 783
(2004).
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these studies during the pre-marketing approval process, Paxil was nevertheless
56
approved for consumption in children with major depressive disorder.'
Apparently, GlaxoSmithKline officials were aware of the dangers in pediatric
consumption of Paxil as early as 1998. GlaxoSmithKline internal memos, released
in 2004 by the Canadian Medical Association, concluded that "[i]t would be
commercially unacceptable to include a statement that efficacy had not been
demonstrated, as this would undermine the profile of paroxetine."'' 57 Furthermore,
company researchers recommended that they "effectively manage the
dissemination of these data in order to minimize any potential negative commercial
impact."'' 5 8 Although these actions are alarming, they are not illegal: so long as
negative test results are disclosed to the FDA, there is no legal obligation to make
these results public. In effect, GlaxoSmithKline's regulatory obligation was
fulfilled simply by reporting the results of this trial to the FDA. If the regulatory
compliance defense were available, GlaxoSmithKline would be immune from-or
liable for significantly less-damages. In an action for failure to warn or
intentional misrepresentation, however, GlaxoSmithKline may not prove so lucky.
In fact, several such actions have been filed against GlaxoSmithKline. As a
result of this data being released, New York's Attorney General Eliot Spitzer filed
suit against the company, alleging that "GlaxoSmithKline deprived physicians of
the information needed to evaluate the risks and benefits of prescribing paroxetine
for children and adolescents with MDD [major depressive disorder]."' 59 The legal
basis for Spitzer's claim was intentional misrepresentation in "playing down
negative pediatric test information."' 60 GlaxoSmithKline eventually settled the
suit for $2.5 million, 16 1 a settlement that also included disclosure of previously
162
unpublished negative study results for public review.
The filing of this lawsuit drew increased attention to the problem of
unpublicized clinical trials. Almost immediately after Spitzer filed suit against
GlaxoSmithKline, the American Medical Association (AMA) called for creation of
a federal database to which researchers would be required to submit clinical trial
information before, during, and after drug approval by the FDA. 163 The AMA's

156. Paxil was approved by the FDA on December 29, 1992. U.S. FOOD & DRUG
QUESTIONS

ADMIN.,

& ANSWERS ON PAXIL, available at http://www.fda.gov/cder/drug/infopage/paroxetine/

paxilq&a.htm (last visited Sept. 21, 2006).
157. Kondro & Sibbald, supra note 155, at 783.
158. Id.
159. Rennie, supra note 68, at 1360.
160. Barry Meier, Medical Editors Likely to Call for Registration of Drug Tests at Outset, N.Y.

Sept. 8, 2004, at C1.
161. For perspective, it is important to consider the earlier figure of $533 million in profits from one
quarter of Paxil sales in 2004. Rennie, supra note 68, at 1360; Alex Berenson, Despite Vow, Drug
TIMES,

Makers Still Withhold Data, N.Y. TIMES, May 31, 2005, at Al.

162. Berenson, supra note 161, at A2.
163. Meier, supra note 160.
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response was followed by widespread calls for fundamental change to the clinical
trial reporting system among medical professionals, medical journals, and
Congress. 164 The FDA responded to this outcry by holding public hearings, and
eventually conceded that children taking SSRIs are 1.78 times more likely to
commit suicide than those not taking the drug. As a result, the FDA began
including "black box" warnings that suicidal tendencies may occur in higher rates
165
in juveniles taking SSRIs.
This is just one example of where the FDA drug approval scheme
inadequately protected American consumers from harm. While both
GlaxoSmithKline and the FDA complied with their regulatory duties, consumers
still have been injured by SSRIs. Here, the tort system served an integral function.
Aside from drawing widespread public attention and debate, the tort system drove
disclosure of potential harmful side effects. Particularly in failure to wam claims,
disclosing much and disclosing early may insulate drug manufacturers from
liability. In effect, the increased threat of tort litigation functions to increase
dissemination of potential risks before consumers are harmed.
B. Tort Claims ProvideRemedies for Non-Compliance with
Post-MarketingRegulation
1. Scope of the Non-Compliance in Post-MarketingReportingProblem
i. Inadequate Enforcement of Adverse Druz Reaction Reports. According
to a recent study reported in the Journalof the American Medical Association, over
770,000 deaths each year are a result of adverse drug reactions in patients. 166 A
2000 report from the FDA indicates that only 10% of doctors make adverse drug
reaction reports at all. 167 At least one commentator suggests that our system of
adverse drug reaction reporting from pharmaceutical manufacturers only identifies
10% of actual adverse reactions that occur in patients. 68 While a drug cannot be
marketed until it passes through the pre-market regulatory process, post-market
compliance is not examined until non-compliance is suggested. 169 This means that
until the scientific community or the public suggest otherwise, compliance with the

164. Id.
165. Jonathon Mahler, The Antidepressant Dilemma, N. Y. TIMES, Nov. 21, 2004, at 8.
166. AGENCY FOR HEALTH RESEARCH & QUALITY, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS.,
PREVENTING ADVERSE DRUG EVENTS TO DECREASE HOSPITAL COSTS 1 (2001),

REDUCING AND

available at http://www.ahrq.gov/qual/aderia/aderia.htm.
167. See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, Adverse Events: Surveillance Systems for Adverse
Events and Medical Errors: Statement of Janet Heinrich 3 (2000), available at http://www.gao.gov/
arch ive/2000/heOO06 It.pdf.
168. Denise Grady, Study Finds New Drugs May Carry Extra Hazards, N.Y. TIMES, May 1, 2002,

at A20.
169. See Green, supra note 8, at 476.
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ADR system is presumed. This downstream regulatory control has proven to be
ineffective at ensuring adequate adverse reaction reporting. Under this regulatory
scheme, it often takes public outcry over drug injuries for a drug to be pulled from
the market.
The initial problem with the current ADR system is that it relies upon
170
voluntary submission of information to drug companies by doctors and patients.
Under the current system, patients report the occurrence of an adverse event either
to their doctor, the manufacturer, or the FDA.' 71 After patients report adverse drug
reactions to doctors, the reporting by the doctor to the drug manufacturer is also
strictly voluntary. 17 2 For both doctors and lay patients, it is often difficult to
separate adverse reactions from effects of the underlying disease. As a result,
many adverse reactions may go unreported.
A second obstacle to an effective ADR reporting system is the failure of drug
companies to report adverse drug reactions to the FDA once they are informed.
According to Professor Michael D. Green, co-reporter of the Third Restatement of
Torts, "[T]he marketing and profit incentives for a pharmaceutical manufacturer
173
are contrary to thorough and accurate gathering and reporting of ADRs." '
Simply, the profit goals of drug companies may undermine their credibility as an
important link in the reporting system. Unfortunately, these conflicts of regulatory
and fiduciary interests often result in a failure to warn consumers of potential
injuries. For example, Professor Green described how one drug manufacturer in
the Bendectin litigation 174 "persuaded doctors who called to report birth defects
associated with maternal use of [Bendectin] to characterize175their calls as 'inquiries'
rather than reports" so as to circumvent the ADR process.
Even when the FDA has access to ADRs, it often fails to adequately assess
the information and disseminate warnings to the medical community. The AMA
recently reported significant failures by the FDA to synthesize reports of dangerous
adverse drug interactions that were already in their databases. 176 According to the
AMA, it was not until researchers from the sponsoring company analyzed the data

170. O'REILLY, supra note 24, at 13-209 to 13-210 ("Drug sponsors must file the reports; others are

encouraged to do so.").
21 C.F.R. § 314.80(b) (2005).
171. Id.;
172. O'REILLY, supra note 24, at 13-209. As of 1990, less than 10% of doctors participated in
adverse reaction reporting. Green, supra note 8, at 55.
173. Green, supra note 8, at 499.
174. Bendectin was a drug approved by the FDA and used by pregnant women in the later 1970s
and early 1980s to curb the effects of morning sickness. See generally MICHAEL D. GREEN, BENDECTIN
AND BIRTH DEFECTS: THE CHALLENGES OF MASS TOXIC SUBSTANCES LITIGATION 331 (1996).
at 129). Worse, the offending drug company also
175. Green, supra note 8, at 499 n.140, (citing id.
was revealed to have denied the existence of birth defects in other pregnant women taking Bendectin.
Id.
176. Bruce M. Psaty et al., Potentialfor Conflict of Interest in the Evaluation of Suspected Adverse
Drug Reactions: Use of Cerivastatinand Risk of Rhabdomyolysis, 292 JAMA 2622,2622-31 (2004).
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themselves (three years after initial approval) that the dangerous drug interaction
became clear. 177 Eve E. Slater, former HHS Assistant Secretary for Health,
attributes this failure to adequately analyze adverse reaction data to the lack of a
centralized system of ADR collection and analysis. 78 Currently, ADR data is
located in separate databases of pre-approved clinical trials, post-approval FDA
information, medical literature, and post-approval data of drug sponsors.
ii. Inadequate Enforcement of Post-Marketing Research. Many drug
companies commit themselves to extensive post-marketing research in exchange
for drug approval under the "priority drug" framework of the user fee program.
Under the accelerated drug approval scheme for priority drugs, a lower threshold
of clinical testing is required for approval for drug marketing. Yet approval under
this accelerated scheme is predicated upon the performance of post-marketing tests
in order to flesh out potential reactions and side effects that the accelerated process
left undiscovered. Unfortunately, these post-marketing tests are often not
completed. A recent FDA report indicated that "of the more than 1300 postmarketing studies to which drug companies have committed themselves, 65% have
79
not been started.'
2. Tort LitigationProvides Remediesfor Post-Marketing
Regulatory Non-Compliance
The FDA mandates reporting of serious adverse effects within fifteen
calendar days, followed by investigation into these adverse reactions. 8 At worst,
failure to comply with procedures may subject a manufacturer to an FDA
regulatory enforcement case.' 8' In effect, many pharmaceutical companies may
fail to report adverse reactions to the FDA because reporting would potentially
cause profitable drugs to be pulled from the market.182 Under a cost-benefit
analysis, the profit of keeping a drug on the market for even a few more days often
far outweighs the cost of a regulatory enforcement action. However, there is no
private cause of action available to plaintiffs against drug manufacturers who fail
83
to file ADRs in a timely manner.'

177. Id. at 2622.

178. Slater, supra note 55, at 295.
179. Okie, supra note 100, at 1065.
180. 21 C.F.R. §§ 314.80(c)(l)(i)-(ii) (2005); Expedited Safety Reporting Requirements for Human
Drug and Biological Products, 62 Fed. Reg. 52237, 52240-41 (Oct. 7, 1997).
181. O'REILLY, supra note 24, at 13-207, § 13:26.
182. See GREEN, supra note 174, at 55 ("Reporting by manufacturers to the FDA, despite the legal
requirement, has been less than perfect.").
183. See Munson v. Eli Lilly & Co., Civil No. 4-86-607 (D. Minn., Nov. 25, 1987). However,
recent legislation has been introduced that would create civil and criminal penalties for manufacturers
failing to report adverse reactions to the FDA. Pharmaceutical Research & Manufacturer Accountability
Act of 2005 (PHRMA) H.R. 870, 109th Cong. (proposing provisions that would fine pharmaceutical
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In several egregious examples, tort remedies continue to provide enforcement
and regulation where FDA measures were inadequate to enforce ADR reporting.
In Benedi v. McNeil-P.P.C., Inc., the Fourth Circuit held that punitive damages
were reasonable against a pharmaceutical manufacturer that withheld ADRs from
84
The plaintiff
the FDA regarding the toxic effects of mixing Tylenol and alcohol.
suffered severe liver injury and transplant as a result of ingesting Tylenol in
addition to his nightly three glasses of wine.' 8 5 According to expert testimony, by
the end of 1992 the manufacturer received more than sixty adverse reaction reports
of the possible mixing between acetaminophine and alcohol. 186 In addition,
numerous scientific studies were cited in support of the finding of a connection
between the two. 187 Although the FDA convened a panel to research the
correlation as early as 1972, it concluded that no warning label alerting consumers
to the risk was necessary because the risk was only associated with consumers who
were chronic alcohol abusers. 188
A more recent case has prompted some members of Congress to propose
criminal penalties for failure to report ADRs. In the Baycol litigation,' 8 9 plaintiffs
alleged that Bayer failed to investigate reports of connections between the diabetes
drug and a rare muscular disorder. During one trial, a note from an official at
Bayer was introduced into evidence. The note read, "If the [FDA] asks for bad
90
news, we have to give, but if we don't have it, then we can't give it to them."'
After revealing that company executives deliberately avoided investigating or
with a group of plaintiffs for
reporting this adverse drug reaction, Bayer settled
91
over $1.1 billion in products liability actions.'
The public outcry over failure to report adverse drug experiences led
members of Congress to introduce criminal and civil penalties for withholding
evidence of adverse effects from the FDA. The Pharmaceutical Research and
Manufacturer's Accountability Act of 2005 was introduced in the House of
Representatives in 2005 by Rep. Stark of California.' 92 The Act called for criminal
penalties for industry executives of up to twenty years in jail and fines not to
exceed $2 million for knowingly concealing adverse drug experiences. 193 The Act

CEOs up to $2 million for withholding adverse reactions, and imposing minimum prison terms of
twenty years).
184. 66 F.3d 1378, 1389 (4th Cir. 1995).

185.
186.
187.
188.

Id. at 1381.
Id. at 1382.
Id.
Id.

189. In re Baycol Prods. Litigation, 321 F. Supp. 2d 1118 (D. Minn. 2004).
190. Berenson, supra note 106, at 2.
191. O'REILLY, supra note 24, at 13-212 (citing Dietra Henderson, FDA Reviews When Bayer
Revealed Drug Risks, CIN. ENQUIRER, Nov. 28, 2004).
192. H.R. 870, 109th Cong. (2005).
193. Id. § 2(a).
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also provided for fines of up to $5 million per month for failure to complete post94
marketing reports in a timely manner.'
In addition to compensating injured consumers, tort litigation over failure to
make adverse reaction reports has prompted public outcry and legislative response.
For pharmaceutical companies, the incentives to avoid filing adverse reaction
reports far outweigh the benefits of making such reports to the FDA.
Strengthening FDA regulatory and enforcement procedures may be effective at
cutting down on this abuse. Yet the threat of punitive damages from thousands of
litigants forces drug manufacturers to consider these litigation costs when deciding
whether to investigate and report ADRs.
C. InadequateFDA Enforcement ofAdvertising Regulation and
PotentialRecovery in Tort
The FDA's 1999 promulgation of the Guidance for Industry on DTC
broadcast advertisements, in combination with the 2001 HHS change in regulatory
letter policy, has effectively given the pharmaceutical industry free reign to
continually broadcast a strain of advertising that is extremely effective-and often
misleading. Consumption of heavily advertised drugs has been increasing
drastically since the draft Guidelinesfor Industry were issued in 1997.'5 By 2003,
the pharmaceutical industry was spending over $2.7 billion on advertising directly
to consumers. 196
While numerous studies have shown that DTC advertising is extremely
lucrative for drug companies,' 97 they have reported that it confuses drug consumers
and increases pressure on doctors to prescribe these high-profile drugs.' 98 The
pharmaceutical industry continues to take the likely position that these ads are
educating the public as to the health benefits of prescription drugs. 199The
American College of Physicians has rejected this reasoning and concluded that
"though information may be put forth in drug advertisements to educate, these ads

194. Id. § 2(j).
195. REPORT TO CONGRESSIONAL REQUESTERS, supra note 80, at

11-14.

196. O'REILLY, supra note 24, at 15-63, § 15:15.
197. REPORT TO CONGRESSIONAL REQUESTERS, supra note 80, at 12 (noting that in 2000, twentytwo of the fifty drugs with the highest DTC spending were among the top fifty in sales).
198. Tamar V. Terzian, Direct to Consumer Prescription Drug Advertising, 25 AM. J.L. & MED.
149, 158, 159 (1999) (stating that 39% of physicians find that DTC ads cause patients to reach incorrect
conclusions); CTR.FOR DRUG EVALUATION & RESEARCH, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS.,
PATIENT AND PHYSICIAN ATTITUDES AND BEHAVIORS ASSOCIATED WITH DTC PROMOTION OF
PRESCRIPTION

DRUGS-SUMMARY

PATIENT AND

PHYSICIAN

OF

FDA

ATTITUDES ABOUT

REQUESTERS, supra note 80, at 16.
199. PHRMA, supra note 85, at 28.
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are primarily calculated to encourage increased consumption of the advertised
200
product.,
1. InadequateFDA Enforcement of Regulations
The advertising that has spawned such industry growth has gone largely
unregulated. One reason has been the 2001 HHS changes to FDA policy, which
have impeded the regulatory letter system to a point where advertisements have
often ended before warning letters are issued.2 0 In some instances, the excessive
lag time that now exists between the observation of a misleading advertisement
20 2
and the issuance of a regulatory letter has been as great as seventy-eight days.
During this delay, hundreds of thousands of potential consumers are exposed to
misleading advertising that will inevitably lead some to request that very drug from
their doctors.
Yet the problem is not only that misleading advertisements are reaching
consumers, but that the misleading advertisements reaching consumers are for
drugs of questionable safety. Under the current system, even when regulatory
letters are issued in a timely manner, pharmaceutical companies are not deterred
from making the same misleading claims in later advertisements. 20 3 The FDA has
been unwilling and unable to enforce DTC advertising regulations that might have
prevented consumer harms from drugs like Vioxx and Paxil.
2. PotentialTort Actions
i. Destruction of the LearnedIntermediary Doctrinefor Over-Promotion.
Yet again, where regulatory enforcement measures are inadequate, tort
remedies may provide a limitation on the over-promotion of drugs. The Third
Restatement of Torts suggests that when a physician has a diminished role in the
decision-making of drug prescription, an additional manufacturer warning may be
necessary. 204 Several cases and commentators have suggested an outright
exception from traditional learned intermediary protection from manufacturer
liability where manufacturers have participated in DTC advertising. 205 According

200. AMER. COLL. OF PHYSICIANS, DIRECT TO CONSUMER ADVERTISING FOR PRESCRIPTION DRUGS

2 (1998), available at http://www.acponline.org/hpp/pospaper/dtcads.htm.
201. REPORT TO CONGRESSIONAL REQUESTERS, supra note 80, at 22-23.
202. Id. at 23.
203. Id. at 21.
204. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 6(d) (1998) ("A prescription
drug or medical device is not reasonably safe due to inadequate instructions or warnings if reasonable
instructions or warnings regarding foreseeable risks of harm are not provided to... the patient when the
manufacturer knows or has reason to know that health-care providers will not be in a position to reduce
the risks of harm in accordance with the instructions or warnings.").
205. Perez v. Wyeth Laboratories, Inc., 734 A.2d 1245, 1257 (1999) (holding that direct to
consumer advertising voids the previous shield under the learned intermediary doctrine); Vitanza v.
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to this argument, the manufacturer's over-promotion of a drug would destroy
learned intermediary protection because it effectively hinders the physician's
ability to exercise professional discretion due to the eagerness of the patient to be
prescribed the advertised drug.2 °6
California courts have applied this logic in cases of drug manufacturers'
advertising products directly to physicians. As early as 1964, the California Court
of Appeals held that where a pharmaceutical company vigorously and successfully
promoted its drug to the medical profession, the company was liable for failure to
warn, despite providing warnings to doctors of the dangers of the drug.20 7 In 1973,
a California district court held that the over-promotion of an antibiotic to doctors,
even in light of warnings, was enough to defeat the application of the learned
intermediary doctrine. 208 Other courts have held that whether pharmaceutical
manufacturers' over-promotion of a drug eroded the effectiveness of warnings is a
question of fact for the jury, and does not invoke learned intermediary
9
immunity.

2

0

While previously applied in the context of manufacturer to physician
advertising,21

the argument that over-promotion destroys learned intermediary

immunity may work in the field of DTC advertising as well. There is powerful
evidence supporting such an argument. First, an FDA survey has shown that, of
39% of respondents who inquired about a drug they had seen in a DTC
advertisement, almost half were prescribed that drug by their doctor. 2 ' The GAO

Upjohn, 214 F.3d 73, 78 (1999) (finding that application of learned intermediary doctrine in light of
DTC advertising is a matter of unsettled law); e.g., Mitchell S. Berger, A Tale of Six Implants: The
Perez v. Wyeth Laboratories Norplant Case and the Applicability of the Learned IntermediaryDoctrine
to Direct-to-Consumer Drug Promotion, 55 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 525, 574 (2000); Sheryl Calabro,
Breaking the Shield of the Learned Intermediary Doctrine: Placing the Blame Where it Belongs, 25
CARDOZO L. REV. 2241, 2313-15 (2004); Bradford B. Lear, The Learned Intermediary Doctrine in the
Age of Direct Consumer Advertising, 65 Mo. L. REV. 1101, 1114-16 (2000).
206. See Kane, supra note 31, at 102 (describing the logic of over-promotion in destroying learned
intermediary protections).
207. Love v. Wolf, 226 Cal. App. 2d 378, 402 (1964).
208. Stevens v. Parke, Davis & Co., 507 P.2d 653, 662 (1973) (finding that even though warning
letters were distributed to doctors, the pharmaceutical company continued to distribute calendars and
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estimates that "about 8.5 million consumers received a prescription after viewing a
DTC advertisement and asking their physician for the drug in 2000. ' '2 12 This data
indicates that drug consumers may be empowered through DTC advertising to seek
specific drugs from their doctors, which minimizes the role of the doctor in the
decision-making.
ii. Misrepresentation Claims. Drug companies that are subject to FDA
regulatory letters may be exposed to liability for intentional misrepresentation. To
establish a prima facie case of negligent misrepresentation, a plaintiff must show
that (1) the defendant made a false representation, concealment, or non-disclosure,
(2) the defendant had knowledge of the misrepresentation, (3) the defendant
intended to defraud or induce reliance, (4) the plaintiff justifiably21 3 relied on
defendant's misrepresentation, and (5) damage resulted to the plaintiff.
Counsel for injured consumers-could build a case around publicly available
information, even without the benefit of discovery. For instance, the FDA posts all
regulatory and warning letters that it issues to drug manufacturers on its website, as
well as responses to those letters.2 14 These letters describe, often in scientific detail,
why the FDA finds an advertisement to be false or misleading. 215 Thus, the FDA's
determination of misrepresentation may satisfy the first element of a prima facie
case. The second and third elements would most likely also be satisfied by the
regulatory letter, particularly where the same misleading advertising tactics are
later used again. In fact, the primary purpose in drug advertising is to induce
consumers to purchase and use the drug. Because the drug companies themselves
conducted the clinical trials, these regulatory letters could establish that drug
companies knew the risks of taking a drug but advertised to the contrary.
The fourth element of justifiable reliance could be proven by testimony of the
plaintiff that she sought the medication from her doctor after seeing the ad on
television. This testimony could also be buttressed by statistical reports that high
percentages of consumers who see DTC ads later ask their doctor for those drugs.
The final damage element could be proven by testimony from the plaintiffs
personal physician, in combination with reports from the clinical trials that this
type of physical harm is precisely the type of injury that was seen in the clinical
trials.
The combination of an accelerated drug approval framework with relaxed
advertising regulations has created a tremendous boom in the pharmaceutical
industry during the past seven years. The FDA has failed in effectively regulating

212. REPORT TO CONGRESSIONAL REQUESTERS, supra note 80, at 16.
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214. See U.S. Food & Drug Admin., Warning Letters and Notice of Violation Letters to
Pharmaceutical Companies, http://www.fda.gov/cder/wam/index.htm (last visited Sept. 21, 2006)
(providing links to warning letters and notice of violation letters, sorted by year).
215. See, e.g., Letter to Merck, supra note 136.
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the expedited approval process, post-marketing reporting system, and enforcement
of advertising. As a result, the pharmaceutical industry has effective control over
the entire drug approval process, from submission of the 1ND to DTC advertising.
Worse, the revolving door of the pharmaceutical industry and the FDA has turned
a formerly adversarial system of drug regulation into a collusive, profit-driven
apparatus. Faced with an ineffective and inefficient system of FDA regulation, tort
remedies are more necessary to consumer protection than ever before.

IV. THE REGULATORY COMPLIANCE DEFENSE REVISITED

Proponents typically advance the regulatory compliance defense as part of
broader tort reform measures aimed at capping damage awards, limiting products
liability actions, and removing cases from the province of the jury. The regulatory
compliance defense is generally proposed either as a total immunity for
pharmaceutical manufacturers from product liability for compliance with FDA
regulations or, alternatively, as an immunity from punitive damage awards for
regulatory compliance. 21 6 It is important to note that proponents of the defense do
not advocate that mere FDA approval should immunize manufacturers from
liability; rather, the defense focuses on compliance with FDA regulatory standards
as basis for immunity.217
There are several reasons why the regulatory compliance defense, though
initially attractive, would prove detrimental to public health. First, the defense
would insulate drug manufacturers from liability, although they are in the best
position to make products safer. Because all clinical trials are performed under the
control of a sponsoring drug company, and most adverse reaction reports are filed
through drug companies, the companies themselves have control over safety in
testing and reporting. Under the common law tort system, pharmaceutical
companies are encouraged to go beyond the minimal safety and warning
requirements of the FDA because regulatory compliance does not presume
satisfaction of the standard of care. Rather, complying with FDA standards is
treated as evidence of compliance with a standard of care, but is not determinative
of satisfaction of that standard of care. As a result, the regulatory compliance
defense would destroy much of the incentive for pharmaceutical companies to
develop safe and effective drugs and to warn consumers in a timely manner when
defects are later uncovered.
It is important to understand that drug companies participating in egregious
behavior may be shielded from liability under the regulatory compliance defense.
For example, Merck complied with all regulatory requirements in gaining approval

216. See Green, supra note 8, at 465.
217. Id. at 481.
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of Vioxx in 1999. In addition, Merck complied with all regulatory requirements by
withdrawing the offending Vioxx ads after warning letters were issued in 2002.
Thus, Merck's liability would have been limited (or totally eliminated) under the
regulatory compliance defense. The same is true of the use of Paxil to treat
pediatric depression. Notably, GlaxoSmithKline was under no regulatory or
statutory requirement to release the results of clinical studies showing increased
incidence of suicide in pediatric depression patients. Worse, the results of those
clinical trials were submitted to the FDA in the initial application process. Thus,
GlaxoSmithKline also complied with its regulatory obligations. In both cases, the
regulatory compliance defense would shield these manufacturers from liability.
Also, the regulatory compliance defense may leave large numbers of injured
consumers with inadequate remedies-or even completely remediless. Under the
FTCA, the FDA is almost always immune from liability for approval of defective
drugs. If the regulatory compliance defense were enacted, medical malpractice
actions against prescribing physicians would be the only remaining remedy for
injured drug consumers. Yet doctors are liable under the Learned Intermediary
Doctrine in only limited cases, where physicians failed to warn patients adequately
of known side effects of a drug. Where a pharmaceutical company has failed to
perform clinical testing adequately or failed to warn of adverse reactions, doctors
should not-and most probably would not-be held liable.
Third, because pharmaceutical companies are profiting from the development
and sale of new drugs, they should also be held responsible where consumers are
injured as a result of their unsafe products and intense marketing campaigns.
Drastic increases in pharmaceutical sales have also significantly increased industry
profits. While some industry critics complain that the costs of tort litigation are
stifling research and development, one industry group reports "dramatic growth in
research and development" between 1990 and 2002-from $8 million to $32
million. 218 Because these companies are reaping the benefits of decreased
regulation, pharmaceutical companies should be the party that absorbs the loss
when the regulations fail to protect the public.
Liability Insurance and Punitive Damages. It is important to briefly note the
role of the insurance industry when discussing the costs of liability. It is true that
all drug companies own liability insurance, and thus do not directly pay the costs
of compensating injured drug consumers. However, liability insurance rates are
based on premiums that drug companies are responsible for paying. Where
liability costs increase, those premiums will inevitably rise as well. Likewise, a
clean safety record and fewer tort actions may reduce insurance premiums for drug
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companies. As a result, drug companies do feel the effect of tort litigation (or lack
thereof), despite having liability insurance.
Even under a form of the regulatory compliance defense that only shields
manufacturers from punitive damages, consumers may still be left remediless. In
many states, compensatory damage awards are statutorily capped. 219 This enables
drug companies to estimate more easily a maximum cost for consumer injury when
performing a cost-benefit analysis of the potential profits from a drug versus the
potential liability cost of potential injured consumers. Because damages are
capped in many jurisdictions, compensatory damages for injured drug consumers
would almost always be outweighed by high potential profit margins.

V. CONCLUSION

The FDA will inevitably make errors in the regulation and enforcement
process. As Richard Merrill, future Chief Counsel of the FDA, remarked in 1973,
"[T]he conclusion is inescapable that the [FDA] occasionally makes wrong
choices, even when all of the facts are before it."' 220 One reason for these wrong
choices is that the entire clinical testing process has always been controlled by the
sponsoring manufacturer. This was true even in 1962, when regulation of the
much smaller drug approval process first became part of the FDA's mandate.2 1 In
fact, it would be virtually impossible for the process to happen any other way. Yet
we continue to ask more of our FDA. In the past fifteen years, reviewer workload
has increased, while time frames for decisions on drug approval have drastically
decreased.222 As the FDA's responsibilities continue to outpace its funding and
manpower, there is a growing likelihood that defective drugs will continue to make
it to market. As a result, drug consumers will continue to be harmed.
Where FDA regulation and enforcement fail, we cannot depend on the
pharmaceutical industry to self-regulate. As corporate entities, it is the goal of
drug companies to earn profits for their shareholders. In fact, corporations have a
fiduciary duty to make sound financial decisions that maximize profits. Inevitably,
conflicts of interest arise between making profits and ensuring a safe product. This
is where tort remedies are most necessary to the preservation of public health and
safety. Tort remedies ensure that, while earning profits for their shareholders, drug
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companies fulfill their duties to adequately test drugs, effectively warn consumers
of potential dangers, and accurately represent the risks and benefits of their drugs.
Importantly, our current tort system encourages manufacturing and selling drugs
for the safest use possible, rather than satisfying minimal safety requirements.
In today's regulatory landscape, new drugs are reaching consumers faster
than ever before, while regulation protecting them from deceptive advertising is
rarely enforced. Tort litigation provides essential remedies for consumers, and
incentives for manufacturers, to ensure consumer safety to the greatest extent
possible. Yet the increasing need for consumer protection has been met by a
decline in both regulation and enforcement. Now more than ever, drug consumers
need tort remedies when injured by harmful drugs.

